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Non-monetary incentives are an important tool in the transition towards a sustainable energy system. It 
seems to be a well-established fact that such incentives can complement monetary incentives to reduce 
energy consumption and to increase green energy uptake (Abrahamse and Steg, 2013; Allcott and 
Mullainathan, 2010; Asensio and Delmas, 2015; Ebeling and Lotz, 2015). Non-monetary incentives 
are often related to the concept of “nudges” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009), defined by Sunstein as 
“liberty-preserving approaches that steer people in particular directions, but that also allow them to go 
their own way” (Sunstein, 2014, p. 583). By now, many countries in the global North and South such 
as the U.S., UK, India, Peru, Singapore as well as supra-national institutions such as EU, UN, World 
Bank established so-called behavioural insight units exploring the applicability of nudges to support 
policy goals in various areas including health, education, and energy (World Bank 2015). Some 
nudges and corresponding non-monetary incentives function well because they are built on general 
behavioural tendencies of humans, such as status-quo bias and loss aversion. Such non-monetary 
incentives seem to be low-cost, easy-to-implement and therefore an effective contribution to 
combating resource overuse and climate change.  
 
How effective are non-monetary incentives in the household energy sector? We found a great variety 
of measures in the literature, ranging from social norms or symbolic rewards to feedback giving and 
information on behavioural consequences. A report by Sunstein (2014) quotes “ten important nudges,” 
among them default settings and social norms atop the list. But how should policy and other decision 
makers decide when implementing an energy reduction plan? Certainly, relative cost-effectiveness 
comparing nudges and traditional policy instruments such as financial incentives is a very important 
criterion (Benartzi et al., 2017). But at least equally relevant is the effectiveness of a measure to reduce 
actual energy consumption in the first place. In this regard, not all non-monetary incentives are equally 
effective and some may turn out to be non-effective at all. Some incentives may be effective in other 




household energy sector. As Sunstein (2014, p. 585) claims “empirical tests, including randomized 
controlled trials, are indispensable.”  
 
An ideal study carried out to answer the question of the effect of non-monetary incentives on 
household energy reduction would use a randomized experimental design and aim at estimating the 
causal effect of a particular non-monetary incentive on the specific energy-related behaviour under 
consideration (Shadish et al., 2001). Researchers would conduct the experiment in such a way that 
subjects are not aware of taking part in a research study. An ideal study would further be conducted 
over a long timespan, and (next to the target behaviour) it would measure behavioural changes in other 
energy-related domains. It would also consider different socioeconomic, regional or country contexts.  
 
Using a covert research design does prevent experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010) – in other 
words, potentially biased results due to the presence of a researcher. Moreover, there is the risk of a 
“Hawthorne effect” that attention alone, i.e. being part of a research study, may account for a decrease 
of household’s energy consumption (Schwartz et al., 2013). Taking longer timespans into account is 
necessary to find out how effective incentives are over time. Further, considering different domains of 
behaviour allows testing of rebound effects or moral licensing (Gillingham et al., 2013; Greening et 
al., 2000; Khan and Dhar, 2006). Individuals and households might increase energy consumption in 
one domain due to energy-saving behaviour in another domain, where the latter was caused by a non-
monetary incentive. Analysing the effects of non-monetary incentives across socioeconomic contexts, 
regions and countries indicates the external validity of study results. Since climate change, energy-
saving behaviour and renewable energy production are global issues and there also exists remarkable 
heterogeneity within countries, it seems desirable to know to what extent non-monetary incentives 






2. Quantitative review data 
It is clear that ideal studies fulfilling all these criteria are hard to find. To shed light on the actual state 
of knowledge, we conducted a quantitative review of the literature about the effectiveness of non-
monetary incentives in the household energy sector. We carried out a literature search based on 
databases (Web of Science, Google Scholar, etc.), various journals (Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, Energy Policy, etc.), and reference lists of papers. Search keywords included 
(combinations of) the terms nudge, nudging, green nudges, energy, electricity, social norm, default, 
feedback, and information. We only considered (quasi-)experimental studies dealing with effects of 
non-monetary incentives/nudges on energy consumption and choice of energy source mix. This means 
that all studies under consideration make use of the advantages of an experimental design. With one 
exception, we limited the search to papers published in English and included all papers without 
constraints regarding year of publication. We thus focus on crucial methodological aspects and 
important research needs. 
 
3. Results 
Almost half of the treatments fail to single out the effect of a particular incentive 
We found 40 papers, mainly published after 2012 (n = 30, 75%). These papers reported on 45 studies, 
of which 42% used fully randomized experimental designs, and 45% used quasi-experimental designs 
where random assignment of subjects or households was not possible. Fewer studies relied on survey 
experiments such as stated choice experiments (11%) and other methods, such as an online tool (2%). 
While fully randomized experimental designs might be preferable, quasi-experimental studies are also 
able to separate effects of different incentives on energy-related behaviour. 
 
The scale of the studies varied remarkably. Sample sizes ranged between n = 37 and n = 2,516,089 
individuals or households; the median sample size amounted to n = 431 individuals/households. 
 
The 45 studies we reviewed included 67 treatment groups, not counting control groups (see Table 1, 




treatments, feedback mechanisms and descriptive as well as injunctive social norm treatments have 
been tested considerably more often than incentives such as social competition, default rules, framing, 
and symbolic rewards. Looking at studies that tested one incentive per treatment, we found that the 
feedback mechanism and descriptive social norms were tested most often, followed by default rules 
and information.  
 
Of 67 treatments, 37 tested one non-monetary incentive as a stimulus, and 30 combined at least two 
incentives (with a total of 72 non-monetary incentives as part of multiple incentives treatments). 
Therefore, in almost half of the treatments it was not possible to separate the effects of non-monetary 
incentives because they combined different incentives in the treatment condition. For example, 
providing subjects at the same time with feedback and descriptive norm information may result in a 
decrease in electricity consumption. While such integrated approaches – programs combining multiple 
incentives – can provide very valuable insights (Banerjee et al., 2015), it is not clear in a strict sense 
whether this effect is due to the feedback, the descriptive norm or the combination of both incentives.  
Regarding treatments testing one incentive, i.e. no combination of incentives in a single treatment, 
Table 1 shows in the last column the proportion of treatments that (according to the studies’ authors) 
showed a statistically significant effect on the outcome at hand. A striking insight is that all studies 
testing default rules revealed a significant effect. Descriptive norms worked out in two thirds of the 
treatments, and other non-monetary incentives seemed to work in half of the treatments. While it is 
difficult to conclude which non-monetary incentive is especially effective for specific behavioural 
domains (see also Elberg Nielsen et al. 2016), it is noteworthy that the studies testing default rules 
mainly investigate green electricity uptake and that descriptive norm studies with significant positive 
effects mainly refer to electricity saving.  However, when interpreting the values in Table 1, the low 





Table 1. Overview of type of non-monetary incentive and the number of studies testing one or 
more incentives  
Incentive/nudging type n, combined 
incentives 
n, one incentive 
only 
Share sign.  
pos. effect  
Information 19 4 2/4 
Descriptive social norm 14 9 6/9 
Feedback 13 9 3/7# 
Injunctive norm 13 – – 
Social competition 6 – – 
Goal setting 4 – – 
Moral suasion 2 2 1/2 
Default rules 1 5 5/5 
Framing – 2 1/2 
Priming – 1 0/1 
Mental accounting – 1 0/1 
Off-setting – 1 0/1 
Decoy choice – 1 0/1 
Symbolic rewards  – 1 1/1 
Indirect information – 1 1/1 
TOTAL n 72 37  
Note: Share sign. pos. effect refers to treatments testing one incentive for which the studies’ authors 
report a statistically significant difference at least at the 5%-level. # We count seven studies because 
two out of nine studies had no control group for the feedback treatment. In these two studies, the 
feedback treatment was designed as control group. 
 
Furthermore, 60% of the studies employed an overt research approach, in which subjects were aware 
of being part of a research study or experiment; the remaining 40% used a covert approach. Overt 
studies are prone to experimenter-demand effects (Zizzo, 2010) and the possibility that a respondent’s 
awareness of taking part in a research studies affected the results cannot be ruled out. A noteworthy, 
randomized controlled study by Schwartz et al. (2013) found an energy reduction “effect” of 2.7% 
simply by informing customers that they take part in a study on energy use. After the “intervention” 
households adjusted to the pretreatment consumption level. It therefore seems important to investigate 






Reported effects might be prone to a cultural bias  
Of the studies reported in the 40 papers, 45% were conducted in the US. Considerably fewer studies 
were carried out in Germany (n = 4), the UK (n = 4) and the Netherlands (n = 2). Compared to the US 
(n = 18) and Western European countries (n = 17), overall fewer studies were found for Asia (n = 5), 
and none for Africa and South America. Thus, the overwhelming majority of studies were bound to 
Western culture. 
Given the limited geographical coverage of current research, results might be prone to a cultural bias. 
While survey research shows that green nudges are accepted by citizens in the US and many European 
countries (Reisch and Sunstein, 2016; Sunstein, 2016), it cannot be ruled out a priori that, like cultural 
differences related to social norms, cooperation and punishment (e.g., Gächter and Herrmann, 2009), 
cross-country differences exist regarding the effects of descriptive and injunctive norms as well as 
default options in the energy sector.  
 
Most studies do not consider temporal stability and rebound effects  
One of the most crucial questions is whether effects of non-monetary incentives are stable over time 
(Abrahamse and Steg, 2013). However, most studies only cover effects over a couple of weeks. There 
are indications that effects of non-monetary incentives get considerable weaker over time (Agha-
Hossein et al., 2014; Brandon et al., 2017; Haakana et al., 1997; Schultz et al., 2015; van Dam et al., 
2010) and it is therefore important to take longer timespans into account. 
It has been supposed that rebound effects and moral licensing can outweigh the benefits of non-
monetary incentives (Gillingham et al., 2013; Greening et al., 2000; Khan and Dhar, 2006). Whether 
consciously or unconsciously, subjects might perceive higher energy consumption levels legitimate 
given their prior green choices. For example, Tiefenbeck et al. (2013) found an increase of 5.6% in 
electricity consumption following a decrease in water consumption by 6% caused by feedback on 
water usage. However, such studies have been conducted in insufficient numbers; this indicates a clear 




4. Where to go from here 
Based on the current state of knowledge, it is hard to tell how effective non-monetary incentives and 
green nudges are. This is not only a question of the number and scope of studies, or of how research 
results are presented; it is also due to limitations in experimental design and study set-up. In the 
following, we would like to point out some needs and recommendations for future research (see Table 
2).  
Table 2. Overview of research needs and recommendations 
Methodological aspect State of knowledge Research needs / 
recommendations 
Estimating the causal effect of 
a non-monetary incentive 
45% of treatments combine 
two or more incentives 
Conducting research to single 
out effects of a particular 
incentive 
Considering the external 
validity of findings 
Most studies conducted in U.S. 
(45%) and Western Europe 
(43%) 
Increasing applications in other 
country contexts, especially 
outside the US and Europe 
Avoiding biased results due to 
experimenter demand effects 
60% use an overt approach Conducting more covert studies 
and studies on experimenter 
demand effects 
Investigating the stability of 
effects over time 
Most studies cover a couple of 
weeks 
Increasing the number of long-
term studies  
Estimating rebound effects and 
moral licensing 
Hardly any study takes 
potential rebound effects and 
moral licensing into account  
Considering other domains of 
energy-related behaviours in 
addition to the target behaviour 
 
 
We recommend that future research aims to separate the effectiveness of specific incentives and to 
compare single incentives with combinations of incentives. Furthermore, large-scale field experiments 
that have high external validity can be complemented by laboratory experiments that have high 
internal validity (e.g., Ghesla, 2017). The latter help to uncover the cognitive mechanisms of why 
individuals react to non-monetary incentives. Regarding the measurement of the effectiveness of non-
monetary incentives, Benartzi et al. (2018) suggest that studies should calculate and report the relative 
effectiveness of interventions in terms of money spent for each kWh of electricity saved. This also 





More research is needed in countries other than the U.S., Germany and the UK. This is worthwhile 
and necessary, also in the light of the growing importance of non-monetary incentives in development 
policy (World Bank 2015). It is important to stress that cultural differences between countries such as 
values and norms are only one aspect that might be crucial for transferring research results from one 
context to another. Other factors include legal structures, market structures, and price conditions.  
Knowledge on the validity and reliability of research findings can be improved by taking experimenter 
demand effects, temporal stability and rebound effects into account. An additional aspect could be to 
analyse who is carrying out the research in terms of subject area, private or public sector 
organizations, etc. and how this might affect research results (see Schmidt, 2017). While from a 
scientific point of view conducting covert studies is preferable to overt studies, this also has to be 
evaluated against ethical criteria such as informed consent as well as new data protection laws in 
Europe. Another aspect, facilitating the evaluation of effects of non-monetary incentives, is the need to 
apply existing standards on reporting experimental results (Abrahamse and Steg, 2013). These 
standards regarding treatment effects include “direction, magnitude, degrees of freedom and exact p 
level, even if no significant effect is reported” (American Psychological Association, 2009, p. 248).  
Further, similar to other research areas, research on non-monetary incentives might be prone to a 
publication bias. This would be the case if the publication of a study depends on the direction and 
significance of its findings (Dickersin, 1990). For example, there might be a tendency to publish 
positive results and to not consider negative ones. While there exist statistical methods to adjust for 
publication bias in meta-analyses, a simple prevention would be that all researchers have to register 
their studies before conducting them (Rothstein et al., 2005). 
Research taking these needs and recommendations into consideration will provide a better 
understanding of the exact benefits of non-monetary incentives in the household energy sector, which 
can then inform (political) decision-making. Finally, but no less importantly, there is the highly 
debated issue of distorted preferences or the unethical use of non-monetary incentives by private 
companies or state authorities. Although the energy sector may be less prone to manipulation, in 




unconscious/automatic processes. This problem certainly deserves more attention (Hausman and 
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Table S1. Description of non-monetary incentives 
Incentive/nudging type Description 
Feedback Real-time energy usage feedback in kWh (e.g. Smart Metering studies, Degen 
et al., 2013 Eco-driving behaviour studies). (Dogan et al., 2014)  
Information Energy information labels (Newell and Siikamäki, 2013) (with CO2 
comparison and/or money comparison) or energy counselling (Degen et al., 
2013) or energy-saving tips (common and/or personalized) (for an overview 
see Abrahamse et al., 2005; Fischer, 2008). 
Descriptive social 
norm 
Communicating a descriptive social norm – that is, what the majority actually 
does. Feedback of energy usage and comparison to a similar household 
(similarity based on geography proximity or usage composition), combined 
with energy usage feedback in kWh. (Allcott, 2011; Cialdini and Goldstein, 
2004) 
Injunctive norm Communicating an injunctive norm – that is, what ought to be done. Combined 
with a descriptive social norm and administered to combat descriptive norm 
boomerang effect. (Allcott, 2011) 
Social competition Feedback in form of household energy usage in kWh in comparison to a 
similar household. Comparing competing household’s energy usages where the 
lowest energy usage wins. 
Default rules Giving a standard choice concerning energy package or energy usage that is 
activated if consumer does not make an effort to communicate another choice. 
(Ebeling and Lotz, 2015; Egebark and Ekström, 2016; Johnson and Goldstein, 
2004; Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008) 
Moral suasion Moral suasion for collective environmental responsibility or collective 
responsibility against future generations. Moral suasion in form of an appeal to 
action, e.g. “Lights out!”. 
Goal setting Setting a prior household energy usage goal with a post measurement to 
compare if goal was reached.  
Framing Influencing the decision outcome by over-emphasizing certain information of a 
decision frame. One identical decision can be framed in different ways through 
emphasizing the possible losses or wins of the decision outcome. (Michalek et 
al; Sunstein, 2011; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) 
Priming Influencing the decision outcome by presenting a stimulus prior to decision 
making. (DeLamater, 2014; Lindenberg and Steg, 2007; Michalek et al.) 
Mental accounting Prior re-filling of ethical mental account of participants to favour the decision 
of green energy uptake. (Momsen and Stoerk, 2014; Thaler, 1999) 
Off-setting Consumers had the possibility to off-set part of their household energy usage 
(could be described as a nudge that promotes more energy usage instead of 
lowering it).  
Decoy choice Adding another choice option that brings consumer no gain but adds noise to 
the choice by irritating consumer with a greater number of choice possibilities. 
Symbolic rewards on 
community level 
Non-monetary rewards for lowest energy usage on the community level (for 
example, media attention and/or an award). 
Indirect information 
 
Educating schoolchildren with energy tips thus indirectly nudging parents with 
energy tips to reduce their household energy usage. 




Table S2. Number of studies per country 
Country n % 
US 18 45  
Germany 4 10  
UK 4 10  
Netherlands 2 5  
Switzerland 2 5  
Japan 2 5 
Sweden 2 5 
Austria 2 5 
Finland 1 2.5 
Israel 1 2.5 
South Korea 1 2.5 
Singapore 1 2.5 







Table S3. Methods 
Method Number Percent 




Experiment 4  
Control trial 3  
Field experiment 7  
Natural field experiment 2  
Laboratory experiment 3  




Field experiment 13  
Natural (field) experiment 5  
Online experiment 1  




Survey experiment 11 % 
Online survey 2  
 
Online choice experiment 2  
Paper survey  1  
Other 2 % 
Online website  1  
TOTAL 45 100 % 






Table S4. Overview on number of treatment groups for each paper (not counting control 
groups)  
Number of papers Number of treatments per paper 
25 papers 1 treatment group 
8 papers 2 treatment groups 
4 papers 3 treatment groups 
2 papers 4 treatment groups 
1 paper 6 treatment groups 
TOTAL PAPERS 40 TOTAL TREATMENTS 67 
Notes: N = 40 papers; N = 67 treatment groups (control groups not counted. Treatment group 





Table S5. Combinations of incentives in multiple-incentive treatments 
Nudge combination Number 
Feedback + Information 4 
Feedback + Information + Goal setting 1 
Feedback + Social competition 2 
Feedback + Social competition + Injunctive norm 1 
Feedback + Social competition + Monetary incentive 1 
Feedback + Social competition + Moral suasion 1 
Feedback + Monetary incentive 1 
Feedback + Injunctive norm 1 
Descriptive social norm + Information 5 
Descriptive social norm + Injunctive norm 
 
2 
Descriptive social norm + Information + Injunctive norm 6 
Descriptive social norm + Information + Injunctive norm + Social competition 1 
Goal setting + Default rules 1 
Goal setting + Feedback + Injunctive norm + Information 1 
Goal setting + Information 1 
Moral suasion + Injunctive norm 1 
TOTAL TREATMENTS 30 
Note: For the sake of completeness, monetary incentives are listed here as they are combined with 





Table S6. Overview of sample size 
Descriptive statistics 
 N studies Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
Percentiles 
25. 50. (Median) 75. 
Sample 
Size 45 80,752.02 383,727.3 37 2,516,089 189 431 1,669 




Table S7. Overview of studies considered in the quantitative review 
















Cook, S. W. 
1980 Energy saving (gas) 
in the household 






Covert The nudging combination of 
feedback plus information 
lead to 12% energy savings 
The effect of feedback 






1997 Energy saving 
(water, heat, 
electricity)  







Finland 105 Randomized 
field 
experiment 
Overt Feedback as single nudge had 
a positive but not significant 





of social norms 
Schultz, P. W.; 
Nolan, J. M.; 
Cialdini, R. B.; 
Goldstein, N. J.; 
Griskevicius, V.  
2007 Electricity saving 
in the household 
(1) Descriptive 






U.S. 290 Field 
experiment 
Overt The nudge of descriptive 
feedback shows a boomerang 
effect that reduces energy 
usage for over-average 
consumption households and 
increases consumption for less 
than average consumption 
households 
The effect of tailored 
information, goal 
setting, and tailored 
feedback on household 
energy use, energy-
related behaviors, and 
behavioral antecedents 
Abrahamse, W.; 
Steg, L.; Vlek, 
C.; 
Rothengatter, T. 
2007 Reducing direct 
and indirect energy 
use with an internet 
based tool 
(1) Feedback + 
Information + 
Goal setting  
Netherlands 189 Randomized 
experiment 
Overt The nudging combination of 
feedback plus goal setting plus 
tailored information lead to 
5.1% energy savings (in 






















2008 Green electricity 
uptake 






























Changing the grey default by 
establishing a green default or 
just by implementing a neutral 
choice situation results in 
significant higher percentage 





Nolan, J. M.; 
Schultz, P. W.; 
Cialdini, R. B.; 
Goldstein, N. J.; 
Griskevicius, V. 
2008 Electricity saving 
in the household 
(1) Descriptive 
social norm + 
Information;  
(2) Information; 
(3) Moral suasion 
U.S. 371 Randomized 
experiment 
Overt Only the nudging combination 
of descriptive social norm plus 
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